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The Splintering of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing in Illinois Courts
Honorable Howard L. Fink *
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental reasons that Illinois courts face
problems or failures when attempting to resolve contractual disputes
stems from courts underutilizing the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The implied covenant mandates that every party to a
contract use "good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement" of the contract.' Specifically, Illinois courts are
splintered about not only the correct remedy, but also about whether
there should be a remedy at all when a contracting party fails to carry
out its promises in good faith.2 Fortunately, some Illinois courts do
recognize the relatively new concept that a remedy exists for a breach
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I. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). It should be noted at the
outset that the Restatement does not limit the applicability of the implied covenant to
any particular type of contract. Rather, the implied covenant applies to all contracts.
While some Illinois courts find an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
every contract, others indicate that the covenant can be expressly disavowed. Cf.
Sinclair v. State Bank, 566 N.E.2d 44, 47 (Il. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991) (citing
Washburn v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 502 N.E.2d 739, 743 (111. App. Ct. 3d Dist.
1986) with American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. General Ry. Signal Co., 540 N.E.2d 557,
561 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989) (citing Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958,
971 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984)). It appears, however, that no case upholds a party's
express disavowal of good faith. Moreover, the implied covenant only covers parties
performance and enforcement of a contract. By its very wording, the covenant does not
apply to the existing law of contracts relating to contract formation. See Market St.
Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991). Illinois has codified the covenant
of good faith only in the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Illinois statute
reads: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-203 (West 1993).
2. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the differing applications of the covenant in the
insurance context).
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of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.3 That concept,
however, struggles upstream against the understandable resistance of
courts to the creation of tort remedies for breach of the implied
covenant that may undermine other, more established, principles of
contract law.4
This article discusses Illinois courts' use of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in contracts. It begins by reviewing the
initial adoption of the implied covenant in Illinois as a basis for relief in
insurance disputes5 and then traces courts' applications of the covenant
in other contexts.6 This article then discusses how the obligation of
good faith and fear dealing in contract enforcement has been
overlooked in Illinois.' Next, it describes a method of analysis which
will help Illinois courts in determining whether a party's action or
inaction constitutes a breach of the implied covenant.8 In doing so,
this article suggests that the implied covenant should be extended to all
contractual relations.9 If Illinois courts use a common vocabulary and
recognize that the implied covenant supplements, rather than displaces,
long accepted principles of contract law, this article maintains that they
can develop a cohesive body of law to supply a remedy for bad faith
breaches of contracts' ° Finally, this article concludes that the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be an enforceable duty
imposed on each contract party to both perform its promises and
resolve any disputes, thereby ensuring that the performance of the
contract meets each party's original expectations.1'
II. A HISTORY OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING IN ILLINOIS
3. See, e.g., Sinclair, 566 N.E.2d at 47 (recognizing that the duty of good faith and
fair dealing exists in every contract); Borys v. Josada Builders, 441 N.E.2d 1263, 1266
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1982) (noting that contracting parties always have a duty to
perform the contract in good faith).
4. See Foy v. City of Chicago, 551 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990)
(refusing to apply the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to an employment-
at-will contract); Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 546 N.E.2d 248, 256 (Ill. App. Ct.
4th Dist. 1989) (declining to expand Illinois law to allow punitive damages for an
alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part ll.B.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Part VI.
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The Splintering of the Implied Covenant
Illinois' initial articulation that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing exists arose in the insurance context. Beginning from
the idea that insurers and insureds have a special relationship
mandating a requirement of good faith and fair dealing, Illinois courts
have also explored the implied covenant's applications in other
relationships. Courts have failed to reach a consensus, however, as to
the implied covenant's function.
A. Insurance Cases - The Initial Application of the Implied Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The context of insurance contracts is significant in triggering the
imposition of liability upon insurers using the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The implied covenant is appropriate in the
insurance context because of several factors present in most insurance
contracts. Generally, (1) the insured enters the contract to obtain peace
of mind and security; 2 (2) the insured seeks protection from loss and
calamity rather than commercial advantage; 3 (3) the bargaining power
of the two parties is "inherently unbalanced" because of the "adhesive
nature" of the insurance contract;' 4 and (4) insurers are suppliers of a
vital service which is quasi-public in nature." Thus, insurers hold
themselves out as fiduciaries. 6 In light of this fiduciary relationship
between insurers and insureds, courts have determined that insurers
are bound by a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
1. Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hospital Care of Hospital
Service Corporation
In 1975, Illinois recognized that insurers are bound by a duty of
good faith and fair dealing. In the seminal case of Ledingham v. Blue
Cross Plan for Hospital Care of Hospital Service Corporation,7 the
Illinois Appellate Court held that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is an independent cause of action in both contract and
tort for an insurance company's breach of its duty to deal fairly with
12. See Sandra Chutorian, Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The
Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 383 n.35 (1986) (citing Egan v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 145 (Cal. 1979)).
13. See id. (citing Egan, 620 P.2d at 145).
14. See id. (citing Egan, 620 P.2d at 146).
15. See id. (citing Egan, 620 P.2d at 146).
16. See id. (citing Egan, 620 P.2d at 146).
17. Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care of Hosp. Serv. Corp., 330 N.E.2d
540 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 356 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 1976).
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the insured.18
In its analysis, the Ledingham court extensively reviewed and then
followed California case law,19noting, "[c]learly then it seems there is
18. See id. at 548.
19. See id. at 546-47 (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967) (recognizing that a health insurer's relationship with a policy holder gives rise to
implied duties, the breach of which would trigger tort liability)). Although this article
focuses on the status and progress of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in Illinois, the early development of the implied covenant occurred principally in New
York and California. See Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200
(Cal. 1958) ("There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
contract that neither party will do anything that will injure the right of the other to
receive the benefits of the agreement."); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188
N.E.163, 167 (N.Y. 1933) ("[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither
party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of
the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract
there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.").
Notably, the New York court's statement in Kirke La Shelle contains no limitation
restricting application of the covenant to insurance contracts or to instances when any
other special or fiduciary relationship exists between contract parties. See Kirke La
Shelle Co., 188 N.E.2d at 167. Additionally, California courts initially refused to
expand the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the commercial realm.
See Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Marina Heights Dev. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 802,
822 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) ("While a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort in the insurance field, we are
not aware of any appellate court case, and none has been cited, extending that principle
to other contractual relationships.") (citations omitted). The California Supreme Court
also determined that an implied-at-law duty of good faith might interfere with freedom to
contract and thus refused to extend the application of bad faith breach to commercial
contracts. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158,
1166-67 (Cal. 1984), overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 44 Cal.
Rptr.2d 420 (Cal. 1995), and overruled in part by Della Pena v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995). For detailed discussions of Seaman's, see
Eileen A. Scallen, Comment, Sailing the Unchartered Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct
Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69 MINN. L. REV. 1161 (1985) and Comment,
Seaman's Direct Buying Service Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.: Tortious Breach of the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in a Noninsurance Commercial Contract Case,
71 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1986).
Thereafter, in Crisci, the California Supreme Court permitted an insured to recover in
tort for emotional damages caused by the insurer's breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. See Crisci, 426 P.2d at 179. Since then, California has been
a leader in the development of the theory of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in the insurance field and in the creation and extension of the concept of the "contort."
See Matthew J. Barrett, Note, "Contort": Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts - Its Existence and
Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510, 510 (1985). A "contort" allows a plaintiff
the opportunity to sue both for contract damages and also for tort damages for alleged
tortious breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See generally
Barrett, supra (reviewing case law in states other than Illinois and arguing against the
extension of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by the acceptance of the
contort); Chutorian, supra note 12 (arguing that the cause of action in tort for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an improper solution to the issues
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an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing in California, and
we are persuaded the same duty should and does obtain in Illinois. 'z
Overall, the court established that the implied covenant imposes
affirmative duties on contract parties-the violation of which is both a
breach of contract and a tort.2'
2. Illinois' Response to Ledingham
Despite the Ledingham court's initial articulation of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a basis for relief in the
insurance context, some Illinois courts have not accepted the implied
covenant. Moreover, even within the courts that accept the covenant,
opinions still differ as to its implications. For example, some Illinois
courts recognize the covenant as a legal ground for relief.22 Other
of inadequate compensation and bad faith conduct in the performance and termination of
contracts); Michael H. Cohen, Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1291 (1985)
(discussing and examining California's development of the "contort"); Scallen, supra
(arguing the denial of contract formation is a variation of the tortious breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and does not give rise to separate tort
liability).
20. Ledingham, 330 N.E.2d at 547. Further, in deciding whether an implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing exists in Illinois, the Ledingham court also looked to
Krutsinger v. Illinois Casualty Co., which held that an insurer can be guilty of bad faith
by arbitrarily refusing to effect a settlement within policy limits. See id. (citing
Krutsinger v. Illinois Cas. Co., 141 N.E.2d 16, 21 (I11. 1957)). Moreover, in a later
case, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that when damages are awarded against the insured
over the policy limits, the insured can recover the excess amount from the insurer. See
Cramer v. Insurance Exch. Agency, 675 N.E.2d 897, 903 (I11. 1996) (analyzing in detail
the fate of Ledingham in the hands of other Illinois courts). Finally, the First District,
in Dykstra v. Crestwood Bank, expressed its reluctance to expand the doctrine of good
faith and fair dealing into the employment-at-will context. See Dykstra v. Crestwood
Bank, 454 N.E.2d 51, 55 (IIl. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1983); see also Disario v. Enesco
Imports Corp., 520 N.E.2d 766, 767 (IIl. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987) (holding that the
circumstances involved in the firing of an employee did not rise to the level necessary
for a tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
2 1. See Ledingham, 330 N.E.2d. at 548.
22. See Cummings v. Beaton & Assocs., 618 N.E.2d 292, 305 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1992) (citing Hansen v. Johnston, 249 N.E.2d 133, 137 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1969))
(noting that the "wrongful prevention doctrine" is a corollary to the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; thus, in situations where the performance of an agreement
becomes impossible due to the willful acts of a party, the agreement to pay becomes
absolute); Sinclair v. State Bank of Jerseyville, 566 N.E.2d 44, 47 (I11. App. Ct. 4th
Dist. 1991) (citing Washburn v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 502 N.E.2d 739, 743
(I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986)) ("It is clear that in Illinois there is an implied covenant of
fair dealing and good faith in every contract."); American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v.
General Ry. Signal Co., 540 N.E.2d 557, 561 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989) (explaining
that, absent express disavowal, the covenant is implied in every contract and that "[t]his
principle is demonstrated in a series of Illinois cases examining the duty of a
contracting party to use reasonable efforts to bring about a condition precedent");
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courts, however, have held that the implied covenant cannot serve as
an independent and enforceable source of duties for contract parties.23
These courts maintain that the covenant is only meant to be used as a
rule of construction when a contract's terms are ambiguous.24
DeKalb Bank v. Purdy, 520 N.E.2d 957, 966 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1988) (holding that
it is not inconsistent to find lack of good faith although no fraud occurred); Borys v.
Josada Builders, 441 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1982) ("It is well
established that every contract contains an implied promise of good faith and fair
dealing between the contracting parties.").
23. See Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. O.R. Concepts, Inc., 69 F.3d 785, 792 (7th Cir.
1995) (noting that in Illinois, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not
impose an independent set of duties on the parties); Guardino v. Chrysler Corp., 691
N.E.2d 787, 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998) (explaining that while every contract
contains the implied covenant of good faith, this covenant neither imposes additional
duties on the parties nor forms an independent tort as a result of its violation); Anderson
v. Burton Assocs., 578 N.E.2d 199, 203 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991) (holding that the
doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith is to be used only for ascertaining the
parties' intent and not as a basis for independent tort liability); see also MacDonald-
Smith v. FMC Corp., No. 89-2280, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 7131, at *19 n.4 (7th Cir.
April 30, 1990) (holding that Illinois law does not recognize a cause of action arising
from the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing); Medina v. Spotnail, Inc., 591 F.
Supp. 190, 196-97 (N.D. I11. 1984) (noting that generally a corporate officer cannot be
held liable for the tortious interference with one of the contracts entered into by the
corporation). Even federal courts are split on application of the implied covenant as an
independent basis of recovery. Compare LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 18 F.3d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the implied duty of good faith
does not modify contractual provisions which define the duties of the parties to a
contract and is not an independent source of contractual or legal duties) with Oil Express
Nat'l, Inc. v. Burgstone, 958 F. Supp. 366, 369 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (explaining that breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in Illinois contracts
may give rise to a cause of action if one party is given broad discretion in performing
the contract and abuses such discretion in bad faith). See also Cutchin v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Nos. 95-2152, 95-2514, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6314, at *3-4 (7th Cir. March
19, 1996) (noting that under Illinois law, the implied covenant does not impose
additional duties on contract parties).
24. See Guardino, 691 N.E.2d at 793 (explaining that the implied covenant of good
faith is not an independent source of obligation for the contracting parties); Northern
Trust Co. v. VIII South Mich. Assocs., 657 N.E.2d 1095, 1104 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1995) (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holtzman, 618 N.E.2d 418, 424 (Ill. App. 1st
Dist. 1993)) (finding that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is "essentially
used to determine the intent of the parties where a contract is susceptible to two
conflicting constructions."); Abbott v. Amoco Oil Co., 619 N.E.2d 789, 795 (I11. App.
Ct. 2d Dist. 1993) (noting that the implied covenant of good faith in a contract can be
used as a construction tool in determining the parties' intent); Continental Mobile Tel.
Co. v. Chicago SMSA Ltd. Partnership, 587 N.E.2d 1169, 1174 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1992) (looking to contract terminology to determine whether the plaintiff asserted a
cause of action under the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing); Anderson, 578
N.E.2d at 203 (emphasizing that the primary use of the implied covenant of good faith is
as a construction tool for deciding the parties' intent); Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat'l
Bank, 154 N.E.2d 683, 690 (Ill. 1958) (stating that every contract imposes a good faith
and fair dealing obligation between parties and "where an instrument is susceptible of
two conflicting constructions, one which imputes bad faith to one of the parties and the
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Further, the way courts apply the covenant often depends on the
context of the case. For example, although the First District agrees
that the same conduct may give rise in some cases to both tort and
contractual theories of recovery, it does not allow a "tort remedy based
on an employer's 'bad faith' breach of an implied contract covenant of
fair dealing" in at-will employment cases.25 In other cases, Illinois
courts have recognized that the covenant can serve as the basis for an
action but have refused to extend the covenant's use as a source of
legal liability beyond the insurance setting.26
3. The Illinois Insurance Code's Potential Preemption of the Implied
Covenant
Along with courts, the Illinois legislature has also recently reacted to
insurance companies' potential use of bad faith. In 1986, Illinois
amended its Insurance Code 27 to allow limited remedies when an
insurance company's refusal to satisfy an insured's claim is found
unreasonable and vexatious. Since this amendment, Illinois courts
other does not, the latter construction should be adopted."). It may be that the
Martindell decision has caused confusion when applied in post Second Restatement
cases. The Martindell case treats the implied covenant between the parties as a valid rule
of construction and considers it a guide to judicial decision makers and others who are
called upon to interpret the parties' express or implied agreement. See Martindell, 154
N.E.2d at 691.
To limit application of the covenant to a rule of interpretation, however, flies in the
face of its plain meaning. Indeed, the Second Restatement of Contract's definition of
the implied covenant specifically restricts the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to
"performance" and "enforcement." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981); see also Market St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991). In
Market Street Associates, Judge Posner indicates that a party can make a binding
contract to purchase something the party knows the seller undervalues. See id.
Specifically, Judge Posner stated, "[t]hat of course is a question about formation, not
performance, and the particular duty of good faith under examination relates to the latter
rather that to the former." Id.
25. Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 998, 1006 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1982) (noting that an employer's breach of contract may give rise to an independent tort
but only in "extreme" cases).
26. See Koehler v. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville, 597 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ill. App.
Ct. 5th Dist. 1992) (citing Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 998, 1006 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1982)) ("Care must be taken to prevent the transmutation of every
breach of contract into an independent tort action through the boot-strapping of the
general contract principle of good faith and fair dealing."); Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 546 N.E.2d 248, 255 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1989) (looking to the Second and
Fifth Districts of Illinois as well as to federal decisions for guidance on whether the
implied covenant of fair dealing is operative in the employee at-will context).
27. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT.. 5/155 (West 1993) (amended 1986).
28. See id. Specifically, section 5/155 states:
In any action by or against a company wherein there is in issue the liability of
a company on a policy or policies of insurance of the amount of the loss
1999l
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have come to different conclusions in determining whether the statute
can preempt a common law claim of breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. In a case against a health maintenance
insurance organization, for example, the Fourth District found that the
statute does not prevent an insured from maintaining a common law
action seeking compensatory damages for an insurer's unreasonable
delay in the settlement of an insured's benefits claim.29 In contrast, the
First District has held that the Insurance Code preempts an insured's
claim against his insurer for common law breach of the implied
covenant.3 ° Further, regarding damages, the Fifth District has
retreated from its original decision in Ledingham31 that a court may
award punitive damages in a "proper case" of breach of the implied
covenant.32 Specifically, in Kohlmeier v. Shelter Insurance Co.,33 the
Fifth District explained that, after Ledingham, the Illinois Legislature
payable thereunder, or for an unreasonable delay in settling a claim, and it
appears to the court that such action or delay is vexatious or unreasonable, the
court may allow as part of the taxable costs in the action reasonable attorneys
fees, other costs, plus an amount not to exceed one of the following amounts
Id. § 5/155(1); see also id. § 125/5-1 (relating to HMOs). Section 5/155 also applies to
HMOs unless the enrollee causes delay by failing to execute a lien. See id. § 125/5-1.
29. See Calcagno v. Personalcare Health Management, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 1330, 1339
(I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991) (noting that the Illinois Insurance Code provisions do not
extend to the recovery of compensatory damages stemming from unreasonable delays in
the settlement of insurance claims); Lynch v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 418
N.E.2d 421, 427-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1981).
30. See Perfection Carpet, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 630 N.E.2d 1152, 1155
(I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994) (relying on legislative intent to decide that a policy holder
is limited to remedies provided by the Insurance Code when an insurer withholds policy
benefits); see also Buais v. Safeway Ins. Co., 656 N.E.2d 61, 63 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1995) (indicating that the Insurance Code provides the sole remedy for a policy holder
bringing a claim of bad faith against its insurance company); Mazur v. Hunt, 592 N.E.2d
335, 337 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1992) (noting that the Illinois Insurance Code
precludes a claim by the insured against insurer for acting in bad faith); Hoffman v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 407 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1980) (explaining that the
enactment of the Insurance Code by the legislature preempted any claims against
insurers for violations of good faith and fair dealing); Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393
N.E.2d 1171, 1180 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979) (agreeing with the reasoning of other
courts that the Illinois Insurance Code is applicable in cases involving a violation of
good faith and fair dealing by insurance companies).
31. See supra Part II.A.1.
32. The court did not provide any guidance regarding what constitutes a proper case.
Rather, it simply held that punitive damages were not proper in that case but might be in
another case. See Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care of Hosp. Serv. Corp.,
330 N.E.2d 540, 549 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 356 N.E.2d
75 (Ill. 1976). The court reversed the trial court's award of punitive damages because the
conduct of the insurer in Ledingham did not rise to a level of sufficient gravity to justify
a grant of punitive damages. See id.
33. Kohlmeier v. Shelter Ins. Co., 525 N.E.2d 94 (Il1. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1988).
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amended section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code to preempt an
award of punitive damages for breach for unfair dealing.34
B. Application of The Implied Covenant of Good Faith And Fair
Dealing Outside The Insurance Context
Several Illinois courts, in a fragmented manner, have extended the
use of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing beyond the
insurance field as an independent basis for relief in contract disputes.
3 5
By reviewing how the implied covenant has fared in the contractual
settings that follow,36 it is apparent that courts' willingness to accept a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an
independent cause of action depends significantly on the type of
relationship between the contracting parties.
1. Real Estate
In the real estate context, Illinois courts are responsible for more
than redressing the effects of defective titles to real property or the
peaceful eviction of tenants who do not pay their rent. Modem real
estate transactions often involve large and complex financing schemes
and long-term relationships between not only the contracting parties
but also suppliers, brokers, lenders, and customers of the parties. The
non-completion of a sale or lease of property may trigger domino-style
losses. Thus, contract parties often rely on each other's good faith
performance of their promises. The implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is implicated when a contract or lease gives either or
both parties a certain amount of discretion which, if used in bad faith,
can result in harm to the other party.
In 1989, the Second District used the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to decide a controversy over the right of first refusal
clause in a commercial real estate contract.37 The Second District
stated in Vincent v. Doebert that, as a matter of law, the implied
covenant applies to all contracts unless the parties explicitly state
otherwise.3" Specifically, in Vincent, the court resolved the question
of whether the plaintiff-tenant, Vincent, had the right to purchase a
34. See id. at 104.
35. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1-6.
36. Those contractual settings are: real estate, no-damage-for-delay clauses, non-
competition agreements, lender liability, discretionary clauses, and terminable at-will
contracts. See infra Parts II.B.1-6.
37. See Vincent v. Doebert, 539 N.E.2d 856, 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989).
38. See id. ("A covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract as
a matter of law, absent an express disavowal.").
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commercial comer he leased in Aurora.39 Vincent's lease contained a
right of first refusal clause in the event the landlord decided to sell the
property. 40  The landlord, however, wanted to sell the property to
another party and, using his discretion to do so, required that Vincent
provide a $10 million guarantor for a $225,000 note to exercise the
right of first refusal.4' The court found that the landlord's requirement
was not made in good faith and therefore violated the implied
covenant.42 Applying the implied covenant, the court found that
"[g]ood faith between contracting parties requires one vested with
contractual discretion to exercise it reasonably and not arbitrarily or
capriciously, and parties to a contract impliedly promise not to do
anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive
the fruits of the contract.,
43
In contrast, the First District in Groshek v. Frainey44 held that
where a prospective real estate purchaser's contract contained an
attorney approval clause, the attorney was not required to either
articulate his reasons for rejecting the contract or propose
modifications.45 One explanation for this result is that exercising the
39. See id. at 857.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 858.
42. See id. at 862 (holding "that the owners did not act in good faith when they
notified Vincent that he had to provide a $10 million guarantor to exercise his right of
first refusal"); see also Case v. Forloine, 639 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1993) (upholding a finding that a prospective purchaser did in fact make a reasonable
and good faith effort to obtain financing notwithstanding his failure to submit a written
mortgage application but recognizing the applicability of the covenant of good faith);
Chemical Bank v. Paul, 614 N.E.2d 436, 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993) (quoting BA
Mortgage & Int'l Realty Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust, 706 F. Supp. 1364,
1376 (N.D. 111. 1989)) (involving a loan agreement for a large apartment building and
stating, "[i]t must be recognized that the implied covenant of good faith reflects a strong
public policy judgment."); First Bank & Trust Co. v. Timmons, 567 N.E.2d 778, 781
(Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1991) (examining how the covenant of good faith fared in a
mortgage foreclosure case where the mortgagors filed a counterclaim alleging failure of
the mortgagee to procure adequate disability insurance); Likens v. Inland Real Estate
Corp., 539 N.E.2d 182, 184 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989) (noting that "[s]imply
because the application did not contain a provision that the lessor will hold a residential
space for a prospective lessee does not mean that the lessor is free to act in bad faith by
refusing to lease the space should the application be approved. Good faith dealing is
implied in every contract.").
43. Vincent, 539 N.E.2d at 862 (citing Foster Enters., Inc. v. Germania Fed. Sav. &
Loan, 421 N.E.2d 1375, 1381 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1981); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Van
Matre, 511 N.E.2d 740, 746 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1987)).
44. Groshek v. Frainey, 654 N.E.2d 467 (Il. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995). In Groshek,
the plaintiff claimed that the defendants' attorney expressed disapproval of potential
zoning problems simply because the defendants had changed their minds. See id. at 469.
45. See id. at 472.
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right to have an attorney legitimately approve a contract does not
constitute bad faith. Illinois courts have not determined whether a
purchaser could require a seller to evict a current tenant where the
purchaser knows that his lawyer will not approve the contract, and is
merely trying to obtain a better bargaining position against a weakened
seller who is unaware that the contract will not be approved. Such
conduct may indeed demonstrate bad faith on the part of the purchaser.
In such a case, the use of the implied covenant would provide an
otherwise unavailable cause of action for the seller.
2. No-damage-for-delay Clauses
In addition to real estate, Illinois courts have applied the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to "no-damage-for-delay" clauses. A no-
damage-for-delay clause denies a contractor's right to recover damages
caused by another's delay.46 In J&B Steel Contractors, Inc. v. C. Iber
& Sons, Inc.,47 the Illinois Supreme Court noted that "It]he most
widely recognized exception to a no-damage-for-delay clause
encompasses bad faith, fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation on
the part of the party asserting the clause's operation."48 The court
declared that "[tlhe exception arises from duties of good faith and fair
dealing implied in every contract. Its operation is, in that respect,
essential to judicial enforcement of the legitimate objects of any
agreement. We therefore agree ... that such an exception should be
recognized in Illinois."49 Notably, "[oinly unforeseeable delays and
obstructions or those not naturally arising from performance of the
work itself or the subject of the contract come within the exception. ' '50
3. Defense to the Enforcement of a Non-Competition Clause
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has also been
extended to non-competition clauses. Non-competition clauses are
included in employment contracts by employers who want to protect
their business from competition brought about by departing
employees. They generally require that departing employees agree not
to compete with the employer after their departure from the business.
These provisions, known as covenants not to compete or non-
46. See Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of "No Damage"
Clause with Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187,
196 (1976).
47. J&B Steel Contractors, Inc. v. C. Iber & Sons, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 1215 (I11. 1994).
48. Id. at 1222 (relying on 74 A.L.R.3d at 215-16).
49. Id. at 1222 (citation omitted).
50. Id.
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competition clauses, may be valid if carefully limited in time and
geographic scope. The employee is protected against the ex-employer,
however, when the employer terminates the employment without cause
and then seeks to use the non-competition clause to punish or harm the
ex-employee. In Illinois, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is a defense to an ex-employer's attempt to enforce a non-
competition agreement. In Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hospital,5" the
Second District held that "the implied promise of good faith inherent in
every contract precludes the enforcement of a non-competition clause
when the employee is dismissed without cause."52
4. Lender Liability
Another area where courts have used the implied covenant is lender
situations. Commercial lenders were shocked in 1985 when the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rendered the
landmark federal decision, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co. 53 In
K.M.C., the Sixth Circuit held that "there is implied in every contract
an obligation of good faith [which may impose upon the lender] a duty
to give notice . . . before refusing to advance funds under [a loan]
agreement., 54 Lending institutions learned that they must now defend
decisions to refuse to continue advancing funds under a loan
agreement - decisions in which they formerly had unrestrained
discretion.55 Also, under K.M.C., lenders may have to pay
substantial damages if they terminate a commercial loan without giving
the other party an adequate opportunity to obtain reasonable alternative
financing.56 The reaction to K.M.C. has included widespread
5 1. Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1994).
52. Id. at 36; see also George S. May Int'l Co. v. Int'l Profit Assocs., 628 N.E.2d
647, 655 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994) (holding that over-broad restrictive covenants
cannot be enforced against ex-employees unless the covenants are needed to protect
long-standing client relationships).
53. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
54. Id. at 759. Section 2-309, comment 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code states,
"[tihe application of principles of good faith and sound commercial practice normally
call for such notification of the termination of a going contract relationship as will give
the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement." Id. (citing U.C.C. §
2-309 cmt. 8 (1989)).
55. See, e.g., Patricia A. Milon, Recent Development, Implied Covenants of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing: Loose Cannons of Liability for Financial Institutions?, 40
VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1216-17 (1987).
56. See Susan D. Gresham, "Bad Faith Breach": A New and Growing Concern for
Financial Institutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 891, 905 (1989) (analyzing the treatment of
lender/lendee cases particularly as applicable to the Uniform Commercial Code); see also
HELEN DAVIS CHAITMAN, THE LAW OF LENDER LIABILITY 4.01 (1990) (discussing the
trend among bank customers to bring suit against lenders and creditors and the emerging
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criticism and a search for ways to circumvent or avoid the decision's
effects on lenders.57 The K.M.C. decision, however, has also
attracted defenders.5 8
In response to K.M.C., Illinois courts have sent a mixed message
regarding the existence of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the lender context.59 Where the First and Fourth Districts of
trend among courts to award increasingly high damages); Milon, supra note 55, at 1225-
26; Chutorian, supra note 12, at 378-81 (discussing issues concerning tortious breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and offering other possible solutions
to commercials acts made in bad faith); Jill Pride Anderson, Comment, Lender Liability
for Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith Performance, 36 EMORY L.J. 917, 928 (1987)
(examining the problems that arise when Uniform Commercial Code notions of good
faith are applied to traditional lending contracts).
57. See Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward A
Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775, 806-16 (1986) (contending that good faith
obligations provide no guidelines of legally permissible conduct and are inconsistent
with the basic notion of fairness that requires notice be given as to what activities are
permissible or prohibited); Loeb H. Granoff, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability:
Flawed Applications of Old Concepts, 104 BANKING L.J. 492, 513-15 (1987) (asserting
that the obligation of good faith has been at times misused by borrowers as "a specious
weapon for recovery"); Corey R. Chivers, Note, "Contracting Around" The Good Faith
Covenant To Avoid Lender Liability, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 359, 382-86 (1991)
(discussing the practical problems associated with parties' efforts to contract around
court-constructed "default" terms); Mark Snyderman, Comment, What's So Good About
Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1364-67 (1988) (citing K.M.C. as a typical example of a hard case
making bad law); see also Christine 0. Sloan, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law
(January 1-December 31, 1992): Lender Liability: Express Terms of a Contract Versus
the Implied Obligation of Good Faith (Commercial Law, pt. 3), 45 S.C. L. REV. 28, 36
(1993). Sloan reviews First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Dangerfield, 414 S.E.2d
590 (S.C. App. 1992), which held that a commercial lender did not breach the implied
covenant of good faith simply because it did not exercise discretion to lessen the
liability of a guarantor in default. See id. at 28. Sloan observes that this holding
departs from K.M.C. but "conforms to the growing national trend not to find a breach of
an implied obligation of good faith when the parties follow the express terms of a
commercial contract." Id.
58. See Kenneth J. Goldberg, Lender Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U. L. REV. 653
(1988). The article reviews Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Maine, 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.
1987), which "upheld a damage award against a bank that had acted within the letter of
its loan agreement with the plaintiff-borrower but had nonetheless . . . acted in bad
faith" by abruptly terminating the plaintiff's credit line within three months of entering
into the credit agreement without giving adequate notice to the plaintiff or negotiating
alternative solutions. See id. After a balanced analysis, Goldberg concludes that many
cases reveal that lenders, rather than the plaintiff's bar, have been aggressive in their
approach to dealing with borrowers. See id. at 665-70. Goldberg suggests that the good
faith standard is an effective way to police unreasonable lender practices. See id. at 672-
80. He contends that a good faith standard encompassing both subjective and objective
components is the best way to instill fairness in the lender/borrower relationship and
still provide certainty for a lender to gauge the acceptability of its practices. See id. at
676-78.
59. See, e.g., Citicorp Savings v. Rucker, 692 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (11. App. Ct. Ist
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the Illinois Appellate Court have followed K.M.C. in finding an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in lender cases,60 the
Seventh Circuit and the Fifth District have not.6' For example, in
Chemical Bank v. Paul, the First District found as a matter of law that
a borrower did not waive the defense of bad faith under a waiver
clause in a loan agreement and personal guaranty.62 The court held,
"[iun accordance with the law and the public policy of this State,
Chemical Bank was required to act in good faith in enforcing the loan
agreements at issue. The exercise of good faith and fair dealing is
particularly critical where . . . the bank was granted considerable
discretion in the use and application of the funds disbursed., 63 The
court also stated that the strong public policy concerns in this context
override any contract provisions.'
Even more recently, the First District has shown its commitment to
the covenant in lender situations. In March 1998, the First District
decided Citicorp Savings v. Rucker.65 In Citicorp, Rucker borrowed
$25,000, which he secured by a mortgage on an apartment building
Dist. 1998), appeal denied, 1998 Ill. LEXIS 1178 (Il1. Oct. 6, 1998). In Citicorp, the
court found that a bank did not breach its implied duty of good faith when a mortgagor
failed to insure the mortgaged property, and the bank procured replacement insurance and
charged it to the mortgagor's account. When the bank actually charged a monthly
premium twelve times greater than the amount represented to the mortgagor, however,
the court held the mortgagor stated a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant.
See id.; see also J & B Steel Contractors Inc. v. C. Iber & Sons Inc., 642 N.E.2d 1215,
1222 (I11. 1994) (recognizing a bad-faith exception to a no-damage-for-delay clause that
"arises from duties of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract"); Groshek v.
Frainey, 654 N.E.2d 467 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995) (holding that a party's rejection
of a real estate contract containing an attorney-approval clause was proper based on a
strict interpretation of the contract's language); Chemical Bank v. Paul, 614 N.E.2d 436
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993) (holding that a guarantor did not waive the implied
covenant of good faith in a loan agreement when he signed a waiver of defense
agreement); Sinclair v. State Bank, 566 N.E.2d 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991)
(holding that a debtor's complaint against a bank alleging a breach of the duty of good
faith was insufficient because it failed to allege a contractual relationship and specific
contractual provisions under which the bank failed to perform in good faith); Vincent v.
Doebert, 539 N.E.2d 856, 862 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989) (finding bad faith when the
owners of property required the holder of a right of first refusal to provide a monetary
guarantee when such a guarantee was not part of the original offer).
60. Chemical Bank, 614 N.E.2d at 442; Sinclair, 566 N.E.2d at 47.
61. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1355 (7th
Cir. 1990); Koehler v. First Nat'l Bank, 597 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (I1. App. Ct. 5th Dist.
1992); see also infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
62. See Chemical Bank, 614 N.E.2d at 442-43.
63. Id. at 442.
64. See id. (reasoning that the amount of discretion given to the bank by the
agreement regarding the use and disbursement of funds required the exercise of good faith
and fair dealing).
65. Citicorp Savings v. Rucker., 692 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).
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that he owned. Rucker allowed the insurance on the building to
lapse.66 In accordance with the previously agreed upon mortgage
provisions, Citicorp informed Rucker that it would obtain insurance
coverage and charge the premium to Rucker's account. 67 Citicorp
obtained the insurance from its own subsidiary, which notified Rucker
that the annual premium of $422 was being charged to Rucker's
account.68 Without notifying Rucker, however, Citicorp actually
charged his account $422 per month, not $422 per year.69 Rucker fell
behind, attempted to tender the $422, and only then learned that the
overdue sum was $4,300.70 Citicorp refused to accept the $422 tender
and treated Rucker as if he was in default.7 ' Citicorp filed a
foreclosure suit and obtained summary judgment for foreclosure and
sale.72 Rucker then filed a counterclaim alleging Citicorp breached its
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and was therefore liable for
negligence and fraud.73 The circuit court entered an order striking and
dismissing the counterclaim.
7 4
On appeal, the First District reversed and remanded, stating that the
duty of good faith and fair dealing requires a "party vested with
contractual discretion to exercise that discretion reasonably and with
proper motive, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent
with the reasonable expectations of the parties."75 The court found that
Rucker had adequately stated a cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant.76
The Fourth District has also recognized the implied covenant in the
lender context.77 In contrast, the Fifth District has refused to extend
the scope of the duty beyond the insurance and employment fields.78
Specifically, it has held that a bank customer failed to state a cause of
action alleging a breach of the implied covenant of good faith where a
66. See id. at 1321.
67. See id. at 1321-22.
68. See id. at 1322.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 1324.
76. See id. at 1325.
77. See Sinclair v. State Bank, 566 N.E.2d 44, 47 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991)
(citing Washburn v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 502 N.E.2d 739, 743 (I11. App. Ct.
3d Dist. 1991)).
78. See Koehler v. First Nat'l Bank, 597 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist.
1992).
1999] 261
262 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 30
bank failed to close a loan at a rate set forth in the commitment
memo.79 Further, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion
by Judge Frank Easterbrook, also declined to follow K.M.C.8 °
5. Contracts which Vest a Party with Discretion
Problems involving the obligation of good faith and fair dealing also
arise when one party to a contract is given broad discretion in
performance.81 The Second District has held that "good faith between
contracting parties requires one vested with contractual discretion to
exercise it reasonably and not arbitrarily or capriciously."82 Further,
the parties "impliedly promise" not to "destroy or injure the other
party's rights to receive the fruits of the contract. 8 3
Although Illinois courts have differed in their application of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in situations where a party has
contractual discretion, they have not rejected it outright.84 For
example, in American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. v. General Railway
79. See id. at 1264. A commitment memo stated the bank's intention to lend if
conditions were met. See id. at 1263.
80. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th
Cir. 1990); see also Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank
Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503 (March 1991) for an example of the
emotion that this field has generated. Patterson attacks Judge Easterbrook's ideology,
method of analysis, and decision in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2 Inc. See id. at 504-05.
Patterson is particularly distressed by Judge Easterbrook's approach to good faith and
contract law which Patterson concludes, "forsakes the Code drafters' efforts to displace
nineteenth century classicism by returning to the bygone days of plain meaning and
objective assent." Id. at 513.
81. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holtzman, 618 N.E.2d 418, 424 (I11. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1993).
82. Vincent v. Doebert, 539 N.E.2d 856, 862 (111. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989).
83. Id. (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 511 N.E.2d 740 (111. App. Ct. 5th
Dist.)); see also Foster Enter. v. Germania Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 421 N.E.2d 1375,
1381 (Il1. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1981) (holding that an arbitrary rejection of an appraisal, in
a contract calling for a mutually acceptable appraisal, would be in bad faith).
84. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 691 N.E.2d
881. 890 (I1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1998) (refusing to allow the defendant to use the implied
covenant of good faith to "bootstrap" an alleged breach stemming from a written
agreement into an alleged breach of a purported oral agreement), appeal denied, 1998 I11.
LEXIS 1030 (I11. Oct. 6, 1998); Northern Trust Co. v. VIII S. Michigan Assocs., 657
N.E.2d 1095, 1104 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995) ("The covenant of good faith and fair
dealing does not enable a guarantor to read an obligation into a contract that does not
exist"); Resolution Trust Corp., 618 N.E.2d at 424 (finding that parties may "enforce
the terms of negotiated contracts without being mulcted for lack of good faith");
Dasenbrock v. Interstate Restaurant Corp., 287 N.E.2d 151, 155 (Il1. App. Ct. 5th Dist.
1972) (finding that defendant could not terminate a lease because he made no application
for licenses, did not act in good faith, and, if the lease were to leave time for performance
optional to lessee, the contract would be void and meaningless).
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Signal Co., 5 the First District noted that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is demonstrated in a series of Illinois cases that
examine the duties of a contracting party to use reasonable efforts to
bring about events that would satisfy a condition precedent.
8 6
Significantly, in these cases, "the contractual obligation of one party
was contingent upon a condition peculiarly within the power of that
party. 87  Thus, the controlling party could avoid incurring any
contractual obligation by refusing to satisfy the condition.88 The court
found in each case that the controlling party's discretion was curtailed
by the implied covenant of good faith.89 The party was therefore
obligated to use reasonable efforts to meet any conditions.9" The First
District held, in accordance with the cases, that the doctrine of good
faith performance imposes a limitation on the exercise of discretion
vested in one party to a contract. 91
Similarly, in Abbott v. Amoco Oil Co.,92 the Second District found
that dealer-supplier agreements, if clear, negate the need for the
implied covenant of good faith as a construction aid.93 Extending
Vincent v. Doebert, the court further articulated that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing requires that the party vested with discretion
exercise it reasonably "and with proper motive, not arbitrarily or
capriciously" or "in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expect-
ations of the parties." 94
85. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. General Ry. Signal Co., 540 N.E.2d 557 (I1.
App. 1st Dist. 1989).
86. See id. at 561 (citing Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 945, 958 (ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984)).
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 561-62.
9 1. See id. at 562.
92. Abbott v. Amoco Oil Co., 619 N.E.2d 789 (ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1993).
93. See id. at 795-96. The court also recognized a "duty of good faith and fair dealing
included in every contract as a matter of law in Illinois."; see also supra Part II.A.2 and
note 24 (explaining that a covenant of good faith is employed as a rule of construction
for ambiguous contracts).
94. Abbott, 619 N.E.2d at 795-96; see also Chemical Bank v. Paul, 614 N.E.2d 436,
442 (Il. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993) (holding that the defendant did not waive the defense
of bad faith when he signed a waiver of defense clause in a loan contract and personal
guaranty); Continental Mobile Tel. Co. v. Chicago SMSA Ltd. Partnership, 587 N.E.2d
1169, 1174 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1992) (holding that a party with contractual
discretion must use that discretion reasonably); Hayes v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co.,
383 N.E.2d 669 (11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1978) (allowing a jury's determination that an
insurance company did not appropriate its agent's property rights to commissions when
it terminated his agency contract to stand).
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Courts now have the difficult problem of determining how to apply
the principle of good faith and fair dealing in situations when a party
retains some discretionary ability. Specifically, courts must determine
whether to use a subjective or objective standard in judging whether a
party has exercised its discretion in good faith. The First District has
already dealt with this issue in Forman v. Benson.95 In Forman, the
plaintiff contracted to purchase a commercial building from the
defendant subject to a credit report.96 Despite the bank's objective
report that the plaintiff was not at risk, the defendant refused to
proceed with the sale based on his interpretation of the credit report.
97
The First District initially stated that because the sale involved a ten
year debtor/creditor relationship, the seller's subjective state of mind
merited consideration.98 Ultimately, however, the court found that the
defendant attempted to use his interpretation of the credit report to
renegotiate the sale and extract a higher price from the plaintiff.99 The
majority opinion held that the defendant acted in bad faith and was
required to sell the property to the plaintiff.' 00 In its analysis, the court
examined two views: the subjective test allowing complete, unfettered
discretion, and the objective test adopting a reasonableness
standard. °0 The court concluded that the objective standard is
preferred when the contract concerns matters capable of objective
evaluation. °2 When a contract provision is added as a personal
concession to assuage the fears of one party, however, a subjective
standard should be used.'0 3 In Forman, the court applied the
subjective standard because the discretion granted was a concession to
the defendant.'O° The court cautioned, however, that the contract did
not grant the defendant "unbridled discretion" but rather discretion
subject to a good faith requirement.' 5
95. 446 N.E.2d 535, 540 (Il1. App. 2d Dist. 1983) (citing Honkomp v. Dixon, 422
N.E.2d 949 (Il. App. 1st Dist. 1981)).
96. See id. at 537.
97. See id. at 538.
98. See id. at 540.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 540-41.
101. See id. at 538.
102. See id. at 538. For example, matters of financial concern are capable of
objective evaluation. See id.
103. See id. at 539.
104. See id. at 540.
105. See id.
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6. Contracts Terminable at Will
The application of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to contracts terminable at will has resulted in a split of opinion
in Illinois courts. The First District, reluctant to allow a party to use
the implied covenant to "bootstrap" tort liability, has refused to extend
a tort concept to an action for breach of an employment contract.1
0 6
The First District has also flatly rejected the contention that an
insurance company can be barred from terminating an insured
pharmacy pursuant to a mutual at-will termination clause under the
doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith.0 7 The court stated that
"[t]erminable at will contracts, such as most employment agreements,
are generally held to permit termination for any reason, good cause or
not or no cause at all."' 18 Similarly, the Fourth District has concluded
that it is incongruous to imply a covenant which restricts a party's fight
to terminate employment at any time.'09
In contrast to the First and Fourth Districts, the Fifth District has
held that at-will employment contracts still imply an obligation of good
faith and fair dealing." l0 In Hentze v. Unverfehrt, the defendant
argued that because the contract contained a provision that it was
terminable by either party upon sixty days notice, it explicitly
precluded any obligation of good faith."' The court, however,
rejected the defendant's argument, holding that though it did not
require good cause for termination of employment under an at-will
contract, such a contract did not expressly renounce a good faith
106. See Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 518 N.E.2d 306 (I1. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1987).
107. See Alderman Drugs, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 515 N.E.2d 689, 694
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987).
108. Id. at 694 ("Thus employees who allege they had been terminated in 'bad faith'
cannot base a cause of action on a violation of the good faith and fair dealing
covenant."). In 1998, the Illinois Supreme Court seems to have laid the matter to rest
by holding that contracts for an indefinite duration are terminable at-will for any reason
or no reason at all. See Jesperson v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., No. 83728, 1998
Ill. LEXIS 915, 9-10 (Ill. June 18, 1998), aff'g, 681 N.E.2d 67 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1997). The court noted that this rule has been long followed in Illinois. Illinois has,
however, carved out a narrow exception to the employment at-will rule for public policy
reasons when an employer discharges an employee in response to the employee having
sought workman's compensation. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 356-
57 (Ill. 1978). This exception is considered separately from the implied covenant. See
id. at 356-59.
109. See Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 546 N.E.2d 248 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
1989).
110. See Hentz v. Unverfehrt, 604 N.E.2d 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1992).
111. See id. at 539.
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requirement.' 12 Alternatively, the court stated that parties who have
negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter "without
being mulcted for lack of 'good faith."" 13 The court ultimately found
that the tactics used and the events that followed the termination, rather
than the termination itself, went beyond the intent of any at-will clause
and, therefore, violated the implied obligation of good faith. 114
III. THE IMPLIED COVENANT'S RELATION TO CONTRACT
ENFORCEMENT
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing also mandates
good faith in the enforcement of a contract."'1 Illinois courts have
almost entirely overlooked this aspect of the implied covenant. If the
covenant serves as an independent source of duties and liabilities for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, courts must explore
its application when a party litigates or defends a contract case in bad
faith.
Despite any specific mention of good faith or fair dealing, a Seventh
Circuit securities case which upheld sanctions of costs and attorneys
fees illustrates the covenant's spirit. The securities industry requires
its customers to agree in advance to settle its disputes by arbitration-
the purpose of which is to provide an "inexpensive alternative to
litigation" for disputes "too small to justify full scale litigation."'' 6
Accordingly, in Paine Webber Inc. v. Farnam, the lower court ordered
Paine Webber to arbitrate certain disputes with its customers." 7 In
response, Paine Webber requested a stay pending appeal." 8 The
Seventh Circuit denied Paine Webber's request finding that Paine
Webber had filed the present suit to rid itself of its obligation to
arbitrate.' In fact, the plaintiff was initially forced to obtain an order
compelling Paine Webber to arbitrate. 120 The court observed that
112. See id.
113. Id. (citing Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357
(7th Cir. 1990)).
114. See id. at 540.
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §205 cmt. e (1981) ("The obligation
of good faith and fair dealing extends to the assertion, settlement and litigation of
contract claims and defenses .... The obligation is violated by dishonest conduct such
as conjuring up a pretended dispute ... ").
116. Paine Webber Inc. v. Farnam, 843 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)).
117. See id. at 1051.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 1052-53.
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"[a]rbitration is neither quick nor cheap when one party litigates to the
gills."'' Although recognizing that Paine Webber was entitled to seek
judicial resolution of its obligation to arbitrate, the court held that Paine
Webber was not entitled to file motions with the sole effect of saddling
its customers with extra costs.' The court stated, "[1]itigants must
think twice before filing papers that put their adversaries to expense;
they must think three times before filing in arbitration cases; there is no
evidence that Paine Webber thought even once before seeking a stay
pending appeal."'2 3 The court then ordered Paine Webber to pay the
costs and attorneys fees incurred in resisting the stay pending
appeal.' 24 Illinois courts should take their cue from the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Paine Webber. Courts should use the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in situations where a party
litigates a contract's enforcement in bad faith.
IV. NECESSARY CHANGES FOR THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AS IT NEARS ITS FIRST QUARTER
CENTURY IN ILLINOIS
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not as robust
as its proponents wish but it is more tenacious than its opponents
desire. Perhaps the covenant has not found easy acceptance, and
indeed outright hostility,'25 because Illinois courts fear it will harm or
destroy deeply held beliefs that the law of contracts should be
governed by principles of certainty, consistency, and predictability." 6
Judges are comfortable with known rules. They are uncomfortable
with introducing well-meaning, but vague, phrases such as "good
faith" and "fair dealing" that may produce inconsistent, unforeseen or
unjust results. The implied covenant's terms "good faith" and "fair
dealing," however, need not be vague. The terms are definable if
courts place them in real world, practical settings. Specifically, in the
best common law tradition, courts should determine whether actions
are made in good faith only after they apply the terms of the particular
contractual relationship before them. 27 Notably, these terms are not
121. Id. at 1053.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. See Id.
125. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform
in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 404 (1980).
126. See Mary E. Hiscock, The Keeper of the Flame: Good Faith and Fair Dealing in
International Trade, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1059, 1061 (1996).
127. The Illinois Supreme Court has said, "where such 'means' prove inadequate to
meet the changing needs of society, or where such 'means' cause injustice, our common
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definable by judicial legislation. Accordingly, if courts wish to make
the covenant into a more robust legal concept, they must agree on its
vocabulary. When courts agree about the terms, they will be more
comfortable with accepting the benefits of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and extending the covenant to all contractual
relations.
A. Defining "Good Faith" and "Fair Dealing"
The terms "good faith" and "fair dealing" in the context of the
implied covenant are not adequately defined by Illinois case law.
Courts' failure to define these terms may explain why some courts
have not accepted the implied covenant of good faith as an independent
source of legally enforceable duties. If courts can agree on what is
covered by the words "good faith" and "fair dealing," they may be able
to agree on what is covered by the implied covenant as a whole.
What does good faith and fair dealing mean? Unfortunately no clear
or simple definition exists. Nonetheless, Illinois courts can look to the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts for guidance. Both the UCC and the Restatement require the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contracts. Section 1-
203 of the UCC states that "[e]very contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement."' 128 Similarly, Section 205 of The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts provides that "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement." 129 Ultimately, Illinois should adopt the Restatement
approach. The Restatement approach is more appropriate than the
UCC approach because it defines the covenant by using an excluder
concept rather an inclusive method.
1. The UCC Definition
The UCC defines good faith in a positive, inclusive manner.
Generally, it defines good faith to mean "honesty in fact in the conduct
law tradition demands they be modified." Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 346
(Ill. 1990) (citing Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896 (I11. 1981)); see also Amann v.
Faidy, 107 N.E.2d 868, 874 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1952) ("We act in the finest common-
law tradition when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-sense justice.").
128. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989). Illinois has adopted the UCC's statement in slightly
different form but with similar substance. See 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-203 (West
1993). It states: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement." Id.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
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or transaction concerned."' 3 ° In Article 2, Sales, the UCC states that
"unless the context otherwise requires... '[g]ood faith' in the case of
a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."13' The UCC's
positive approach, however, has been criticized. 3 2 In the context of a
diversity case involving a requirements contract, Judge Richard Posner
of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals lamented that "[t]he Uniform
Commercial Code does not contain a definition of 'good faith' that
seems applicable to the buyer under a requirements contract."' 33 Judge
Posner also complained that the term was a "chameleon" with no
settled meaning in the law.'34
Similarly, Professor Robert S. Summers explains that "the attempt
to capture in a set of normally necessary and sufficient conditions
some characteristic or characteristics common to all things that are or
could be called 'good faith' is doomed to failure."'35 Summers has
also questioned the meaning that courts and the UCC draftsmen have
130. U.C.C. § 1-201(19); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-201(19).
131. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-
103(l)(b) (West 1993).
132. See infra notes 133-47 and accompanying text.
133. Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir.
1988).
134. See id.; see also Market Street Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir.
1991) (noting that the meaning of good faith is cryptic and confusing). In considering
the meaning of the contractual duty of "good faith," Judge Posner noted that "Wisconsin
cases are cryptic as to its meaning though emphatic about its existence, so we must cast
our net wider. We do so mindful of Learned Hand's warning, that 'such words as 'fraud,'
'good faith,' 'whim,' 'caprice,' 'arbitrary action,' and 'legal fraud,' . . . obscure the
issue." Id. at 593 (quoting Thompson-Starrett Co. v. La Belle Iron Works, 17 F.2d 536,
541 (2d Cir. 1927)). Judge Posner points out the term, as used in the implied covenant,
is limited to performance and does not apply to the formation of the contract. See id. at
594. Judge Posner sees the duty of good faith in contract cases as giving rise to contract
remedies and as falling "'halfway' between a fiduciary duty (the duty of utmost good
faith) and the duty merely to refrain from active fraud." Id. at 595. He sees good faith as
forbidding "the kinds of opportunistic behavior that a mutually dependent, cooperative
relationship might enable in the absence of rule." Id. To Judge Posner, "'[g]ood faith'
is a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in a
way that could not have been contemplated at the time of drafting, and which therefore
was not resolved explicitly by the parties." Id. (quoting Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2,
Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990)).
135. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 828 (1982) (paraphrasing J. L. AUSTIN,
SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 70-71 (1962)); see also Chivers, supra note 57, at 364 ("The role
the good faith covenant plays in this scheme is not exactly clear. The covenant is
amorphous. Nearly all jurisdictions instruct courts to imply it but do not provide a clear
formula to inform the courts' discretion. We have thus imported a doctrine without
having first agreed what that doctrine is to do.").
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given to the phrase "good faith,"' 3 6 contending that the phrase "good
faith," as used by courts, "is best understood as an 'excluder."
' 137
That is, good faith excludes forms of "bad faith" but fails to maintain
its own meaning.138 Summers criticized the UCC drafters for giving
the phrase a "general, invariant meaning: 'honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned." 139
Attempts to use an inclusive definition of good faith fail because
courts do not and cannot consistently clarify the positive meaning of
the phrase. 4 ° Summers offers a practical solution: rather than
searching for a definition of good faith, a lawyer should determine
what the judge wishes to exclude in a given case by using this term. 14 1
Summers then suggests that "[o]nce the relevant form of bad faith is
thus identified, the lawyer can ... assign a specific meaning to good
faith by formulating an 'opposite' for the species of bad faith being
ruled out.' 142  Summers illustrates this method by an example.
Suppose a judge states: "A public authority must act in good faith in
letting bids.' 43 One can infer that the judge, in effect, is conveying
that "[t]he defendant acted in bad faith because he let bids only as a
pretense to conceal his purpose to award the contract to a favored
bidder."' 44 In this context, "'acting in good faith' means letting bids
without a preconceived design to award the contract to a favored
bidder."'45 Summers concludes that "[w]hen a judge uses the phrase
good faith, one is frequently unable to attach a definite meaning to it
without knowing what, in context, the judge means to exclude ...
,,146 Judges, as a practical matter, are usually "more interested in what
they are proscribing than in characterizing what is generally
136. See Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968)
[hereinafter Summers, Good Faith].
137. Id.; see also infra notes 148-63 and accompanying text.
138. See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 136, at 196.
139. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 1-201(1989)).
140. See Burton, supra note 125, at 369. A party who exercises discretion for any
purpose within the contemplation of the parties acts in good faith; a party who uses
discretion to recapture foregone opportunities acts in bad faith. See id. at 373; E. Allan
Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 666, 669 (1963) (good faith results "in
an implied term of the contract requiring cooperation on the part of one party to the
contract so that another party will not be deprived of his reasonable expectations.").
141. See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 136, at 200.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 200-01.
146. Id. at 201 n.32.
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allowed.'47
2. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts Definition
Summers's analysis and definition is more than academic. In fact,
Summers influenced the late Robert Braucher, the Reporter for the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.'48 Thus, the Restatement effect-
uated the excluder concept. The comments to Section 205 of the
Restatement provide "meanings" for the term "good faith."'' 49 After
describing the UCC's definition as "'honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade, ,, 150 the Restatement (Second) of Contracts departs from both
the UCC and the 1931 Restatement of Contracts, stating that "the
phrase 'good faith' is used in a variety of contexts," and its meaning
fluctuates accordingly.15 ' The Second Restatement explains:
Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and
consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it
excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving
'bad faith' because they violate community standards of
decency, fairness or reasonableness. The appropriate remedy
• also varies with the circumstances. 52
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts encompasses three bold
developments in contract law since 1931. First, the Restatement
imposes the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
contract.153 Second, it requires a commitment to "contractual morality"
and, more fundamentally, a commitment to justice according to the
law. 5 4 This commitment is neither narrow nor technical; it enables
judges to avoid results which reward and thereby encourage breach of
contract.5 5 Third, by applying the excluder approach to its definition
of "good faith," the Restatement gives the term broad opportunity to
develop. 156 The definition is not completely open-ended, however,
147. Id. at 206.
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmts. a-e and reporter's note
(1981) (citing Summers, Good Faith, supra note 136).
149. See id. cmt. a.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. § 205.
154. See Summers, supra note 135, at 811.
155. See id. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a distinct departure from
the concept of Holmes and the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries.
156. See id.; supra note 135, at 811-12.
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because the Restatement clearly limits its application to contract
performance and enforcement.'57 Moreover, it is not to be used in the
events leading up to the creation of the contract. Rather, the definition
comes to life only after the contract is entered.
158
Applying the excluder approach, the Restatement indicates that:
[s]ubterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith
in performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be
justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be
overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require
more than honesty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith
is impossible, but the following types are among those which
have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit
of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful
rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to
specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in
the other party's performance.
159
The Restatement (Second) comment also instructs that "[t]he
obligation of good faith and fair dealing extends to the assertion,
settlement and litigation of contract claims and defenses."'' 60 Under
the Restatement's excluder approach, good faith in enforcement means
an obligation may be violated by dishonest conduct including the
following: "conjuring up a pretended dispute, asserting an interpret-
ation contrary to one's own understanding, [and] falsification of
facts."' 16 1 A good faith duty also "extends to dealing which is candid
but unfair, such as taking advantage of the necessitous circumstances
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205.
158. See id. cmt. c; see also Market St. Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir.
1991) (noting that after contract formation, "[t]he parties are now in a cooperative
relationship the costs of which will be considerably reduced by a measure of trust,"
triggering the good faith duty); Burton, supra note 125, at 373-74 (suggesting that only
bad faith contract performance should be actionable).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d.
160. Id. cmt. e; see also id. §§ 73, 89. Section 73 provides, "[p]erformance of a
legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute
is not consideration; but a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what
was required by the duty in a way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain." Id. §
73. Section 89 provides:
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side
is binding
(a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not
anticipated by the parties when the contract was made; or
(b) to the extent provided by statute; or
(c) to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material
change of position in reliance on the promise.
Id. § 89.
161. Id. § 205 cmt. e.
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of the other party to extort a modification of a contract... without
legitimate commercial reason."' 16 2 Other judicially recognized good
faith violations include "harassing demands for assurances of
performance, rejection of performance for unstated reasons, willful
failure to mitigate damages, and abuse of power to determine
compliance or to terminate the contract."'
163
3. The Excluder Method Offers Needed Flexibility in Defining Good
Faith and Fair Dealing
If courts can agree to accept the need for a long term process of
defining the implied covenant's terms using an excluder methodology,
courts will be ready to take the next step. That is, courts will be able
to determine whether application of the implied covenant as an
independent source of legal duties and liability will assist them in
resolving controversies in a just manner without destroying the values
of consistency, predictability, and liberty of contract.
Some courts will balk, complaining that the excluder approach does
not supply them with a clear, positive set of rules. These courts will
insist that the law must consist of detailed rules. Such particularized
rules, they will claim, allow people to accurately predict the
consequences of a decision to disregard those rules. Predictability is
particularly important in contract disputes because it is a fundamental
principle of contract law."6 Many people simply want to know what
the rules are and are not concerned with the policy behind them.
Others, however, are concerned with policy and believe that if a rule
and its policy conflict, some "sub-rule" should then fulfill or satisfy
the reason or principle for the rule. 165 The excluder approach offers
162. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2).
163. Id.
164. The principles of the common law have included a deeply ingrained belief that
the law of contracts must allow the parties to predict accurately and precisely what a
court's reaction will be if a party does not fulfill its promise. Oliver Wendell Holmes'
hypothetical "bad man" wanted to know the "material consequences" if he did not keep
his promise. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 167, 171 (1920). Holmes' answer was that one need not keep a promise if the
consequences of breaking one's word in a particular case would be profitable to the
promise breaker. See id. at 175. The law was merely an oracle which would allow the
bad man to predict the consequences of his action or inaction. See id. at 173. To
Holmes, the law was simply "prophesies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious. ... The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that
you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else." Id. at 173-75.
165. See SAMUEL C. COVAL & JOSEPH C. SMITH, LAW AND ITS PRESUPPOSITIONS 76
(1986) (suggesting that legal rules should be interpreted in light of the policies, or
goals, of the society that created the rule, and that such an interpretation can be made
without destroying predictability).
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the benefit of assigning a specific meaning to good faith while
allowing needed flexibility on a case-by-case basis.
B. Illinois Should Extend the Implied Covenant to All Contractual
Relations
The genius of science is its ability to face a present day reality and
realize that an established principle no longer solves a given problem.
This ability should also be present in our application of the law. In
some circumstances, our existing rules work well. In others, our
existing rules do not comport with present day standards of fairness
and decency. Similarly, rules devised in the days of expanding
frontiers, emerging capitalism, new theories of evolution, and social
survival of the fittest may produce consistent and predictable results.
These rules, however, may also produce injustice and actually invoke
a court's power to actively aid a person who comes to court in bad
faith. To obtain just results in all instances, courts need flexible rules
and sub-rules.
The Second Restatement's definitions give parties and courts the
tools to work out solutions within the law's rules. Illinois courts,
however, have been reluctant to extend the implied covenant of good
faith beyond fields that clearly require it. 16 6 The covenant of good
faith should apply to all contractual relations. Accordingly, courts
should seek sub-rules in the factual settings that will fit similarly
situated parties' needs and expectations when entering into contracts
under the same circumstances. For example, HMO's, PPO's and
other managed care entities have drastically altered relations among
physicians, hospitals, and patients.167 These new relationships have
spawned a national debate about perceived bad faith performance by
managed care companies that have allegedly coerced doctors,
hospitals, and pharmacists to deny treatment or even to fail to inform
insured patients of available tests or procedures. 168 The relationships
166. See supra Part II. Illinois has employed the implied covenant of good faith in
the insurance and real estate contexts; in no-damage-for-delay clauses and in non-
competition clauses; in the context of lender liability; in contracts that vest one party
with discretion; and in contracts terminable at-will.
167. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 373 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding in an
ERISA case that "incentives can rise to the level of a breach where, as pleaded here, the
fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no longer exists (i.e.,
where physicians delay providing necessary treatment to, or withholding administering
proper care to, plan beneficiaries for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses").
168. See Brendan Stephens, 7th Circuit Ruling Sends Suit Against HMO to Trial, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., August 19, 1998 at I (reporting on the decision in Hedrrich v. Pegram
that the plaintiff had a cause of action based on her health plan's bad faith). The
plaintiff alleged that bonuses paid to physician-administrators were based upon the
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in this field alone require intensive inquiry by attorneys and courts
about how Illinois law can use the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to adapt to changing times. The law must be able to
accommodate changes in science, technology, and economics.
Similarly, although the employment at-will arrangement gave
employers and employees an absolute right to terminate their
relationship'69 and sometimes caused harsh results, its use still met the
necessities of the first half of the twentieth century. For example, IBM
or United States Steel Corporation employees in the early 1950s could
expect to remain with their companies for life. Could they or their
companies have foreseen the microchip, the closing of steel mills, or
the downsizing of the 1990s? Could the courts of the 1950s have been
any more clairvoyant? Indeed, can late twentieth century or twenty-
first century courts provide any clearer oracles?
Perhaps we can only hope for principles that enable us to solve
problems in changing times. In addition to the current rules, therefore,
courts must also concern themselves with the underlying principles
and reasons for the rules. Courts should always be ready to adjust the
rule to fit its reasoning. Following this paradigm, courts need not fear
and resist the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing but
should use it to satisfy a fundamental principle of contract law. To
wit, the law can fashion a full remedy when a contract party refuses to
perform its promises in good faith.
V. REMEDIES
Justice Felix Frankfurter 7 ' once asked, "[d]oes anybody know...
where we can go to find light on what the practical consequences of
[our] decisions have been?"'' Justice Frankfurter's question reflected
his belief in the wisdom of judicial restraint. Following Justice
Frankfurter's tradition, Illinois courts have exercised judicial restraint
by refusing to slide down the proverbial "slippery slope" and create a
new cause of action based on the tortious breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. This judicial restraint is appropriate.
Illinois does not need, nor should courts create, such a tort. The
difference between total plan costs and revenues so that an incentive existed for
physician-administrators to limit treatment to ensure larger bonuses. See id.
169. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text (discussing the split in the
Illinois courts over the applicability of good faith in employment at-will contracts).
170. Justice Frankfurter was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States from 1932-1962.
171. THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS iv (Theodore L. Becker & Malcolm M.
Feeley, eds., 2d ed. 1973).
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing simply does not need tort
remedies to fulfill its purpose. Indeed, a variety of acceptable
remedies for breach of the implied covenant already exist in Illinois.172
These remedies satisfy the expectations of innocent contract parties
when the other party breaches the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
Creating a new cause of action sounding in tort is unnecessary and
counterproductive. Specifically, such a creation would require courts
to use tort law concepts that define legally enforceable duties and to
resolve problems relating to the physical and economic security of
people and property. Those concepts are different from those used to
define duties and resolve problems in the field of consensual
contractual relations. Generally, contract parties simply want certainty
and predictability.173 They oppose giving factfinders the opportunity
to subject them to damages beyond those voluntarily assumed if the
factfinders decide that failing to fulfill a promise was tortious.
Fortunately, courts need not risk this unforeseen or unwanted result.
The law of contracts already provides a suitable range of remedies for
breach, including the right to receive the benefit of the bargain, known
as reliance recovery. It should also provide the right to receive
satisfaction of contractual expectation - the loss of a party's bargain
plus consequential damages within the contemplation of the parties.'74
In Illinois, courts today risk a failure to satisfy the expectations of
parties who voluntarily act in ways they believe are governed by
enforceable rules of law. Illinois has so failed because it has not used
already available concepts and remedies in a cohesive and creative
manner. Such a cohesive set of rules would satisfy the contract goals
of certainty and predictability. 175 Furthermore, the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing can provide a remedy that will satisfy parties'
contractual expectations. In some instances, a contract party may
benefit economically by choosing to breach its obligation under a
contract and merely pay the non-defaulting party damages based upon
the difference between the contract price and the sold price. Indeed,
under Justice Holmes's "bad man" theory, a party may be actually
172. See infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
173. See Chutorian, supra note 12, at 391 n.2 (citing L.L. Fuller & William R.
Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 375 (1937));
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 126 (1965).
174. See Hentze v. Unverfehrt, 604 N.E.2d. 536, 541 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1992);
see also Chutorian, supra note 12, at 392 n.85 (citing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 90 (2d ed. 1977) for the proposition that in order for a breach to be
"efficient" (and thus socially useful), it is crucial that expectation damages be awarded).
175. See infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
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encouraged to do so. 76 This sort of breach flies in the face of the
party's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It certainly
defeats and frustrates the expectation of the other party who has kept
his promises in good faith. When a party engages in bad faith
performance or a bad faith defense, failure to award contract and
procedural remedies in a cohesive manner also results in unjust
frustration of the non-defaulting party's expectations. 177 Further,
failure to award damages including attorneys' fees to persons
defending a bad faith claim unjustly frustrates the expectation of a
defendant.178 The covenant of good faith should not be permitted to
become a weapon of bad faith.
Courts can obtain a satisfactory result by providing for fee shifting
and compensatory damages upon a finding that a party performed or
enforced a contract in bad faith, and the bad faith acts caused the non-
breaching party's lOSS. 179 The amount awarded would simply place
the non-breaching party in the same position as if there had been no
breach of the implied covenant of good faith. The non-breaching party
would receive full expectation but would not gain a windfall of
punitive or mental distress damages available in tort law. Moreover,
the party who uses the court system in bad faith to defeat or delay an
innocent party's expectations or to harass an innocent party will know
176. See supra note 164 (discussing how contract law allows promise-breakers to
foresee the consequences of breaking a promise).
177. See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 136, at 253.
178. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137. Rule 137 requires attorneys and unrepresented
parties to sign pleadings motions, and other documents in good faith. See id. If the
court finds that the documents were not signed in good faith, i.e., not warranted by
existing law or intended for an improper purpose, it will impose appropriate sanctions.
See id. The defendant in a breach of contract action should be able to expect that if the
court finds he did not break his promise and was wrongfully accused, the court should put
him back in the position he would have been had the plaintiff not brought the suit in bad
faith.
179. See, e.g., Falcon Assoc. v. Cox, 699 N.E.2d 203, 208-09 (I11. App. Ct. 5th
Dist. 1998) ("When a party is required to retain an attorney to enforce its contractual
rights, that party does not receive full compensation, even when it receives the contract
price, because that party is required to pay its attorney and the costs of litigation.");
Donnelly v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 424, 432 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1985) (allowing recovery for foreseeable consequential damages where an insurance
company breached the implied covenant of good faith by failing to inform and also
giving incorrect information on the procedure and rates for conversion of life and health
insurance policies to a decedent who lost coverage under a group policy); Clark v.
Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 386 N.E.2d 890, 897-98 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1979) (permitting plaintiff to state a claim for consequential damages based on the loss
of his home because defendant refused to pay benefits under the disability insurance
policy issued in connection with the mortgage); see also Calcagno v. Personalcare
Health Management, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 1330, 1339 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991)
(allowing recovery of compensatory damages for prelitigation attorney's fees).
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that the longer he engages in such behavior, the more he will pay in
sanctions. 8 ° Indeed, by using Illinois Supreme Court Rules 137,81
201(c),1 82 206(e),183 218184 and 219,185 which contain sanctions for
bad faith in other situations, 186 and by enforcing the existing rules
which require monetary bonds for frivolous appeals, 87 courts need
not create new rules to prevent a party from profiting through its
breach of the implied covenant.
VI. CONCLUSION
Illinois courts have generally accepted that the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing exists. Yet, they have not developed a
cohesive method for using the implied covenant in situations where a
180. See Paine Webber Inc. v. Farnam, 843 F.2d 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 1988);
Douglas R. Richmond, The Two-Way Street of Insurance Good Faith: Under
Construction, But Not Yet Open, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 95, 95 (1996) (noting that
sanction for breach of duty of good faith may apply to insureds as well as insurers).
18 1. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137 (providing for sanctions if a document filed with the court
is not "well grounded in fact and... warranted by existing law or a good faith argument"
for a change in the law).
182. Id. at R. 20 1(c) (preventing abuse in discovery by allowing the court to issue
protective orders to prevent "unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment,
disadvantage, or oppression" and to supervise discovery).
183. Id. at R. 206(e) (allowing a court to terminate a deposition if the opponent
conducts an examination in bad faith).
184. Id. at R. 218 (requiring parties to participate in pretrial procedures and
conferences).
185. Id. at R. 219 (providing for a range of consequences for refusal or failure to
comply with discovery rules). In addition to, or in lieu of, the seven specific "remedies"
listed in subsection (c), the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,, may impose
an appropriate sanction such as an order to pay the other party for reasonable expenses
incurred as a result of the misconduct including reasonable attorneys' fees and fines for
willful conduct. See R. 219. The committee comments cite North Park Bus Service, Inc.
v. Pastor, 349 N.E.2d 664 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1976) and Safeway Ins. Co. v.
Graham, 544 N.E.2d 1117 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989) (holding that penalties may be
imposed in the trial court's discretion). The language of the Rule is intended to affirm a
trial court's authority to impose a monetary penalty against a party or its attorney. See
R. 219 cmt. c (citing Transamerica Ins. Group v. Lee, 518 N.E.2d 413 (I11. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1988) (McMorrow, J., dissenting)). See generally Shimanovsky v. General
Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 289 (I11. 1998) (instructing trial courts on limiting
principles relating to Rule 219(c)).
186. See, e.g., R. 91(requiring "good-faith participation" in arbitration hearings);
see also Bachmann v. Kent, 689 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997)
(upholding the trial court's sanction striking defendant's rejection of an arbitration
award for failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137). Bachman cited
Hernandez v. Williams, 632 N.E.2d 49 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1994), for the proposition
that the "purpose of Supreme Court Rule 137 is to punish litigants who plead frivolous
or false matters or bring suit without any basis in law." Id.
187. See R. 305 (providing for enforcement of judgments pending appeal); R. 375
(permitting a court to impose sanctions for "appeal[s] not taken in good faith").
The Splintering of the Implied Covenant
contract party fails to perform his undertaking in good faith or attempts
to enforce his rights unfairly. The lack of such a cohesive method has
led to underutilization of the implied covenant.
An agreement on the meaning of good faith and fair dealing is a
necessary first step. Illinois courts should utilize the excluder method
which provides a uniform approach while still allowing for flexibility
in individual cases. Illinois must then accept the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing as part of every contract and determine
whether the party's performance or enforcement of rights was in good
faith in the particular factual situation before the court. Judges can
then decide whether the party's performance of a contract or exercise
of defense is in bad faith. If the court finds no bad faith, the duty of
good faith performance and enforcement mandated by the implied
covenant was not breached. Alternatively, if the court finds that the
party exercised bad faith, the duty was breached.
When a court finds that a party has breached its duty to perform or
resolve disputes in good faith, it need not create a new tort to supply a
remedy. Rather, it should fashion and implement a remedy using
existing rules of procedure and contract law that will justly satisfy the
contractual expectations of the injured party. In doing so, the court
will make contract law into a cohesive and more effective social device
without impinging on the equally valid and necessary goals of
certainty, predictability, and freedom of contract.
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